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GO NOT WHERE THERE IS A PATH: PRESCRIPTIVE
EASEMENT LAW IN NEW MEXICO AFTER
ALGERMISSEN V. SUTIN
MARK S. BARRON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Rooted deep in ancient common law, with little guidance from legislatures, the
acquisition and utilization of implied servitudes' has long proved to be one of the
most complex bodies of Anglo-American law.2 Courts are forced to sift through
great bodies of case law in order to parse out the analogous facts needed to justify
decisions that, by nature, are fact intensive. Furthermore, since servitudes involve
usage, rather than ownership,3 the difficulty of finding proof of the existence of an
activity (or lack thereof) over long periods of time makes the job of both the
advocate and the fact finder infinitely more complicated. As a result, this area of law
has emerged as one replete with legal fictions and capable of multitudinous
interpretations. 4
InAlgermissen v. Sutin,5 the New Mexico Supreme Court attempted to clarify and
restate the law of prescriptive easements6 in New Mexico, leading to a questionable
result and raising a few particularly interesting issues. In a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Minzner, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim to an easement
by prescription.7 More importantly, the court used the Algermissen opinion as a
vehicle to reevaluate the traditional common law elements of the prescriptive
easement claim, turning to persuasive secondary sources' in an attempt to simplify
future law.9
This Note will examine the historical background behind acquisition by prescription in order to understand the context of the court's decision.'0 It will then attempt
to focus on what the court in Algermissen saw as the difference between the law of

* Class of 2006, University of New Mexico School of Law. This Note is dedicated to Apolinar Taveras
and Leandro Skye Taveras. Their courage inspires my work and their lives enrich my own.
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines a servitude as "[a]n encumbrance consisting in a right to the limited use
of a piece of land... without possession of it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (8th ed. 2004). There are four types
of servitudes: (1) easements, (2) irrevocable licenses, (3) profits, and (4) real covenants. Id. This Note will focus
on a claimant's ability to acquire an easement in New Mexico when such a right is not expressly provided for. See
infra note 6.
2. Within the English tradition, the law of servitudes developed as a branch of property law dealing with
incorporeal hereditaments, or non-possessory rights that are treated as property. I THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 5.04(g)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § Scope (2000)
(describing servitudes as among the "most complex and archaic bodies of 20th century American law").
3. See supranote 1.
4. See infra Part II.
5. 2003-NMSC-001, 61 P.3d 176.
6. An easement is "an interest in land... consisting in the right to use or control the land.. .for a specific
limited purpose." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 548 (8th ed. 2004). Prescription is one method through which title
to an easement can be acquired. The elements that must be properly met in order to acquire an easement by
prescription vary across jurisdictions. The elements that must be met in order to acquire an easement by prescription
in New Mexico are the subject of this Note.
7. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,
1, 61 P.3d at 179.
8. The court relied heavily on the rationale of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000),
and much of the opinion was dedicated to reconciling New Mexico case law with the Restatement.
9. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 110, 61 P.3d at 180.
10. See infra Part I.
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New Mexico as it was and the simplified version the court was adopting."
Subsequently, this Note will analyze alternative approaches the court could have
taken in light of its expressed objectives. 2 Finally, this Note will conclude by
assessing the decision's implications for the law of New Mexico. 3
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to evaluate the change to New Mexico law affected by the supreme
court's ruling in Algernissen, it is necessary to examine the historical development
of prescriptive easements. In fact, it may be this history that compelled the court to
attempt a simplification of the law." Unlike possessory rights, which were often
protected by adverse possession statutes, rights to usage without possession
generally did not enjoy the support of legislatures. 5 As 6a result of this legislative
omission, courts developed the doctrine of prescription.'
The development of easements by prescription dates back to 1275, when the
English Parliament enacted a statute prohibiting challenges to possessory rights if
those possessory rights could be traced to the inception of Richard I's reign in
1189.17 Although Parliament's law only applied to rights of seisin,'" the courts
extended the same protection to showings of continuous usage "in the nature of an
easement or profit."' 9
As time passed, however, usage extending back to 1189 became more difficult
to prove, and English courts responded by creating a series of helpful
presumptions.20 The first of these presumptions assumed that if use had existed
beyond the memory of any living person, it would be understood to have existed
from 1189.2" In 1623, this standard began to shift when a statute was enacted
prohibiting suits for ejectment 22 beyond twenty years; judges looked to this statute
and held that, if a prescriptive use extended back more than twenty years, it would
be presumed to extend back to 1189.23 For prescription to be a sustainable doctrine,
however, a more definite standard was needed to protect the usage rights of

11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infraPart VI.
14. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § Scope (2000) (acknowledging the historical complexity of the law of servitudes).
15.

JESSE DUKEMINTER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 811 (5th ed. 2002).

16. Id.
17. Id. See generally THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 2, § 5.04(g)(2) (summarizing the
emergence of legal fictions and the statutory history of the parallel law of profits). Profits, like easements, are a type
of servitude involving the use of land without ownership. See supra note 1. Specifically, a profit is "[a] servitude
,
. 1 .t.her-w.ise
.
that gives the right to pasture cattle, dig fur ui.erali, or
DICTIONARY 1247 (8th ed. 2004).
18. In its original context, the concept of seisin simply meant possession and applied to both land and
tangible property. CORNELIUS J. MoYNIAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 11, at 27 (3d ed. 2002). Eventually, in relation to land, seisin came to refer specifically to possession under claim
of ownership. Id. Therefore, a tenant may have possession but not seisin; seisin is retained in the landlord. Id.
19. DUKEMNIER & KRER, supra note 15, at 81 1.

20. Id.at812.
21. Id.
22. Ejectment refers to a cause of action in which a person with title to property seeks to recover possession
from an occupier of the property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
23. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 812.
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easement holders.24 The result was the creation of the fiction of the "lost grant,"
which established that, if a use could be shown to have existed for twenty years, "the
presumption of a grant could not be rebutted by evidence that no grant had... been
made."25 Although useful, the extent of fiction inherent in this development was not
lost on English courts:
Juries were first told that from user, during living memory, or even during
twenty years, they might presume a lost grant or deed; next they were
recommended to make such presumption; and lastly, as the final consummation
ofjudicial legislation, it was held that a jury should be told, not only that they
might, but also that they were bound to presume the existence of such a lost
grant, although neither judge nor jury, nor any one else, had the shadow of a
belief that any such instrument had ever really existed.26
In the United States, where proving usage since 1189 would have been impossible,
most jurisdictions ignored the traditional English presumptions and developed an
independent law of prescription by analogizing to statutes of limitations applicable
to the recovery of possession.27
The adoption of the statute of limitations applicable to possessory claims was
only one half of the equation. The type of usage that would generate a prescriptive
right had to be defined as well, and American courts generally required the same
elements be met as those necessary for the assertion of possessory rights.2 8 This is
the context in which the law of New Mexico was formulated. The court in
Algermissen acknowledged that "[tihe elements of [a prescriptive easement] claim
are the product of many years of historical development," and pointed to Hester v.
Sawyers 9 as the genesis of that development in New Mexico.30
Keeping true to the historical spirit of the law, the court in Hester prefaced its
discussion of prescriptive easement law in New Mexico by pointing out that the
state had no statute that expressly authorized the acquisition of an easement by32
prescription. 3' In fact, the court in Hester expressly rejected the servient tenement
owner's argument that the state's adverse possession statute should apply to the
easement holder's claim and, therefore, incorporate that statute's requirement of

24. See id. "[T]hese presumptions did not provide an effective system of prescription because they were only
presumptions and could be overcome by evidence showing that some time since 1189 (perhaps 25 years before the
lawsuit) the use could not or did not exist." Id.
25. Id.
26. Bryant v. Foot, 2 L.R.-Q.B. 161,181 (1867).
27. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 812. The manipulation of adverse possession statutes for
prescriptive claims is discussed in Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 502-03, 71 P.2d 646,649-50 (1937). See infra
notes 31-37 and accompanying text. New Mexico, like the majority of American jurisdictions, "adopted the rule
that the period of use for acquiring such title by prescription corresponds to the local statute of limitation for
acquiring title to land by adverse possession." Hester,41 N.M. at 502, 71 P.2d at 649.
28. DuKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 812.

29. 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646 (1937).
30. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 10, 61 P.3d at 180. The court in Hester contemplated usage that was
"open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious, adverse, under a claim of right, and continue[d] for a period often years
with the knowledge or imputed knowledge of the owner" as requisite to establishing an easement by prescription.
Hester, 41 N.M. at 504, 71 P.2d at 651.
31. Hester, 41 N.M. at 501, 71 P.2d at 649.
32. The servient tenement refers to the property that will be encumbered by the prescriptive right. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (8th ed. 2004).
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color of title for acquisition of possessory rights.33 According to the supreme court
in Hester, "[t]he statutes of limitations do not directly apply to actions in
34
which.. .easements[]... are involved, but only to actions for the recovery of land.
While disqualifying the applicability of the adverse possession statute in relation
to claims of prescriptive easements, the supreme court in Hester still held that the
period necessary to create an easement is determined by that statute.35 The logic of
the holding is rooted in the historical concerns surrounding the development of the
prescription doctrine. 36 The court's attempt through common law to establish a grant
since time immemorial set no specific time period for the manifestation of an
easement. Instead, this attempt led the courts to analogize to the law of adverse
possession and apply that statute of limitations in easement cases.37
The distinction between this law as adopted by American jurisdictions and the
traditional English application is in the foundational strength of the presumption of
a grant.38 In New Mexico, the presumption of a grant is conclusive, and once
sufficient time has passed to satisfy the prescriptive period, the presumption will not
be undermined by evidence to the contrary.39
The inquiry, of course, does not end here. The character of usage necessary to
acquire rights to an easement still needed to be established.' In doing so, the
supreme court in Algermissen relied on the elements articulated in Hester41 in
with what seems to be the overwhelming practice of New Mexico
accordance
42
courts.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Defendants in this case were several families who owned property located
between the east side of the Rio Grande River and Rio Grande Boulevard in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 43 The plaintiffs were recreational trail users who wished
to cross this property on a long dirt pathway known as "Elfego Road." This

33. Hester, 41 N.M. at 503, 71 P.2d at 650. The current version of the New Mexico adverse possession
statute retains the color of title requirement. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-22 (1973).
34. Hester, 41 N.M. at 502, 71 P.2d at 649 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 503, 71 P.2d at 650.
36. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
37. Hester, 41 N.M. at 503, 71 P.2d at 650. The supreme court in Hester emphasized that the adoption of
the necessary period is the extent of the statute's applicability. "Statutes of limitation are not otherwise involved
or material." Id.
38. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
39. Hester, 41 N.M. at 504, 71 P.2d at 650. The adoption of this rule is consistent with the doctrinal
adjustments made by most jurisdictions to the difficulties inherent in the English common law insistence on tracing
grants back to 1189. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 30.
41. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 10, 61 P.3d at 180; see supra note 30.
42. See, e.g., Bloom v. Hendricks, 111 N.M. 250, 253, 804 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1991); Brooks v. Tanner, 101
N.M. 203,207, 680 P.2d 343, 347 (1984).
3, 61 P.3d at 179. Although there are more than ten families or
43. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,
individuals named as defendants, the court's opinion only references two defendant families, the Alleys and the
Sutins.
44. Id. 1 3, 61 P.3d at 179.
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pathway connected the defendants' homes, beginning at Rio
45 Grande Boulevard and
ending at the Rio Grande River in Rio Grande State Park.
Elfego Road served to provide private ingress and egress over the defendants'
property and was not maintained by the City of Albuquerque or by any other
government entity. 46 While evidence of its precise course was not presented to the
court, the road had remained in place over essentially the same property throughout
its existence4 7 and had been in use since at least the 1940s48 Most of the landowners
along the road only maintained private residences on their property, although the
defendant family, the Alleys, also ran a horse business. 49 Defendant family, the
Sutins, however, did not maintain a residence, nor had they ever lived on their
property. 0
In 1992 or 1993, the Alleys constructed a fence and a gate that closed off their
driveway and forced anyone wishing to access the Rio Grande River via Elfego
Road to traverse property belonging to the Sutins.5 When a 1995 attempt by the
Sutins to sell their property fell through because the commitment for a title
insurance policy contained exceptions for the possibility of prescriptive easements,
they too constructed fences and a gate that effectively precluded anyone from
crossing the property." The combined effect of these actions was to cut off
5 3 Elfego
Road completely and prevent plaintiffs' access to Rio Grande State Park.
B. ProceduralDisposition
Following a bench trial in May 2000, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claim
to an easement by prescription, with prejudice. 4 Plaintiffs appealed to the court of
appeals, which certified the matter to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
IV. RATIONALE
In its opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court began by discussing the
appropriate standard of review 6 before considering each element of a prescriptive
easement claim individually. 7 The court's ruling was rooted in the elements of
prescriptive easements, but it did briefly address other arguments made by the
defendants. 5' First, the court considered the defendants' assertion that prescriptive

45. Id.
46. 1d. 14, 61 P.3d at 179.
47. Id.
48. Id. 5, 61 P.3d at 179.
49. Id. 4,61 P.3dat 179.
50. Id.
51. Id.16, 61 P.3d at 179.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id. 1, 61 P.3d at 179.
55. Id.
56. In its consideration of the standard of review, the court considered both the claimants' burden of proof
at the trial court level and the appropriate appellate deference to trial court discretion. Id. 9, 61 P.3d at 180; see
also infra Part IV.A.
57. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,1 9,61 P.3d at 180.
58. Id.90 8, 26, 61 P.3d at 180, 184-85.
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easements may not be granted purely for leisure and recreational purposes.59 Second,
the court raised, although it did not address, the peculiar nature of a public easement
by prescription and the constitutional implications such a finding might entail. 60
A. Burden of ProofandAppellate Review
At trial, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had not met their burden of
proof in establishing all of the elements of a prescriptive easement.61 It is the rule in
New Mexico that, in establishing such a claim, each of these elements must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. 62 Further, in reviewing such a factintensive finding, great deference is given to the discretion of the trial court.6 3 The

supreme court expressed its reluctance to overturn a finding against the party with
the burden of proof whenever there could be a rational basis for the district court to
"disbelieve the evidence offered in support of the contrary finding."' The court
determined that when elements are to be proven by clear and convincing evidence,
it is the fact finder's job to weigh that evidence and determine where the truth lies.65
In its evaluation of the district court's decision, the scope of the supreme court's
review was detailed and extensive.6 6 The court stated that it is not enough that the
general claim be proven by clear and convincing evidence; rather, it is necessary that
each and every element of the claim meet that standard. 67 Therefore, if the plaintiffs
failed to meet this burden as to any individual element, the court mandated that their
claim must fail and the district court's decision must be affirmed.68
In order to establish an easement by prescription, the court determined that it was
the responsibility of the plaintiffs to show that the public used the passageway for

59. Id. 26, 61 P.3d at 184-85. The district court had concluded that prescriptive easements cannot be held
for recreational purposes or purely for convenience, a proposition suggested by the defendants. Id. Although the
supreme court based its decision on other grounds, the court did express doubt as to the validity of the district
notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
court's conclusion on this issue. Id.; see infra
60. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 26,61 P.3d at 185. Schlieterv. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 510, 775 P.2d
709, 712 (1989), was cited in support of the jurisprudential principle of avoiding constitutional questions unless
compelled to answer them. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 26, 61 P.3d at 185. The defendants claimed that any
public easement granted would be a taking of private property without compensation. Id. Among its concerns, the
supreme court noted "that no government entity is a party to this lawsuit, and it would therefore be impossible to
decide who should pay such compensation." Id. Because the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the elements
of a prescriptive easement were not met, however, it declined to address this argument. Id.
61. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 8, 61 P.3d at 180. As noted earlier, the district court also held that
prescriptive easements cannot be awarded for purely recreational purposes, see supranote 59, but this proposition
was disregarded by the supreme court and, as such, is not addressed in this Note. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC001, 126, 61 P.3d at 185.
62. A4germi.sven, 2003-NMSC-001, %9.61 P.3d at 180 (citing Village of Capitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524,
524, 632 P.2d 1162, 1162 (1981) (requiring substantial evidence of the elements for a prescriptive easement));
Scholes v. Post Office Canyon Ranch, Inc., 115 N.M. 410,411,852 P.2d 683, 684 (Ct. App. 1992) (requiring each
element be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence).
63. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 9, 61 P.3d at 180.
64. Id. (citing Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 110 N.M. 614, 616, 798 P.2d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 1990)).
65. Id. (citing State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v.Williams, 108 N.M. 332, 335, 772 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct.
App. 1989)).
66. Id. (considering each of the elements separately).
67. See id. (citing Scholes, 115 N.M. at 411, 852 P.2d at 684 (holding that "each element required to
establish a prescriptive easement has been proven by clear and convincing evidence") (quoting Maloney v.
Wreyford, 111 N.M. 221, 224, 804 P.2d 412, 415 (1990))).
68. Id.
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a period of ten years in an "'open, uninterrupted, peaceable, notorious, [and]
adverse' manner, under a claim of right," and with the knowledge of the owner.69
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that they had met their burden as to each required
element and, so, the supreme court addressed each separately.7"
Despite acknowledging the historical pedigree of the aforementioned elements,
the court nevertheless announced that it would not constrain its analysis to the
traditionally enumerated elements and would use this case to "clarify the law of
prescriptive easements."'" In so doing, the traditional elements were criticized as
being redundant and a seemingly more succinct approach, modeled on the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, was proposed.7 2 It was the court's
claim that the elements embodied in the Restatement encompass all of the historical
requirements and the remainder of the opinion attempted to reconcile this secondary
source with precedent.73
B. Adverse Use and the Impact of PresumptiveReasoning
Once the problem was laid out, the first element attended to by the court was the
adverse nature of the plaintiffs' use.74 The opinion began by turning its attention to
the Restatement in order to derive a working definition of "adverse use. ' The court
settled on "use made without the consent of the landowner... [and] also the type of
use that would normally give rise to a cause of action in tort."76
69. In acknowledging these elements, the court quoted Village ofCapitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524, 525,
632 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1981). Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 919, 61 P.3d at 180. Village of Capitan,itself, cited
Lovelace v. Hightower, 50 N.M. 50, 65, 168 P.2d 864, 873 (1946), for this list. Village of Capitan,96 N.M. at 525,
632 P.2d at 1163. Lovelace, like the court in Algermissen, traced the historical development of these elements to
Hesterv. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497,504,71 P.2d 646,651 (1937). Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180;
Lovelace, 50 N.M. at 65, 168 P.2d at 873. The great majority of the cases cited in the Algermissen opinion point
directly to Hester as the source of these elements. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Dale Bellamah Homes of N.M., Inc., 76
N.M. 526, 528, 417 P.2d 25, 27 (1966).
70. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 9,61 P.3d at 180.
71. Id. 10, 61 P.3d at 180.
72. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § § 2.16-2.17 (2000)). "A prescriptive use is...a
use that is adverse to the owner of the land or the interest in land against which the servitude is claimed...."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 (2000). "A servitude is created by a prescriptive use of
land.. .if the prescriptive use is: (1) open or notorious, and (2) continued without effective interruption for the
prescriptive period." Id. § 2.17. In its incorporation of the Restatement's logic, the New Mexico Supreme Court
followed the example of numerous federal and state jurisdictions that have referred to the Restatement in discussing
servitudes. See Tannaz Simyar, Comment, Hiner v. Hoffman: An Analysis of the Hawai'iSupreme Court'sDecision
and Its Impact on Hawai'i'sCommon Interest Communities, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 177, 196-97 n. 175 (2003); see
also, e.g., Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 950 (Colo. 2002) (finding the Restatement consistent with Colorado
precedent); Cook v. Hartman, 77 P.3d 231, 237-38 (Mont. 2003) (comparing Montana easement law to sections
2.16 and 2.17 of the Restatement); Schmiehausen v. Zimmerman, 2004 Ohio 3148,9140 (Ct. App. 2004) (claiming
that the Restatement view "would certainly simplify [the court's] analysis").
73. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 11 0, 61 P.3d at 180. It should be noted that the court recognized the
unique analytical problems inherent in easements sought by public prescription. Id. Section 2.18 of the Restatement
involves these issues and clearly states that "[tihe public may acquire servitudes by dedication and prescription."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 (2000). In considering the facts before the court, however,
the opinion claimed that the analysis of this type of prescriptive easement would be the same if the plaintiffs had
only requested a private prescriptive easement. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180-81.
74. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 9111,61 P.3d at 181.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. b (2000)). The comment mentions
that typical causes of action in tort include trespass, nuisance, and waste. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. b (2000).
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The court then pointed out that, under many sets of ambiguous circumstances,
this definition is of little assistance in and of itself due to the difficulty of proving
a particular type of usage over the passage of time.77 In response to this challenge,
the court acknowledged the helpfulness of employing a series of presumptions.7"
The first of these presumptions was that usage originating in permission is presumed
to continue as permissive until an overt, affirmative event takes place that alerts the
landowner to a right hostile to that owner's interests.79 The second presumption was
less favorable to landowners, suggesting that, absent proof of express permission,
if all other elements of a prescriptive easement claim are satisfied, the use will be
presumed to be adverse.8"
In defense of its analysis to follow, the court cautioned that both in accordance
with its own rules8' and the case law of the state82 these two presumptions were
merely persuasive "rhetorical devices."83 The court further noted that the
Restatement, whose rule the court was attempting to adopt, takes no official position
on the use of presumptions.84
With this foundation, the court first inquired into whether or not the defendants
ever granted the plaintiffs permission to use Elfego Road as access to Rio Grande
State Park. It was quickly pointed out by the court that New Mexico case law does
not construe "permission" so narrowly as to mandate express permission; evidence
of implied permission will suffice to rebut the presumption of adversity.86 The court
noted that Hester v. Sawyers,87 which established the presumption of adversity in
New Mexico, specifically stated, "[I]f a use has its inception in permission, express
or implied, it is stamped with.. .permissive character."88 Conversely, once evidence
rebutting the presumption of adverse use is presented, the claimants are not
necessarily denied, but they must present evidence of adversity sufficient to meet
their burden of proof.89

77. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 11, 61 P.3d at 181.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 505, 71 P.2d 646, 651 (1937)).
80. Id. (citing Vill. of Capitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524, 525, 632 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1981); Sanchez v. Dale
Bellamah Homes of N.M., Inc., 76 N.M. 526, 529, 417 P.2d 25, 27 (1966)).
81. Id. (citing Rule 11-301 NMRA).
82. Id. (citing Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240, 244, 771 P.2d 173, 177 (1989)).
83. Id. (quoting Griego, 108 N.M. at 244, 771 P.2d at 177).
84. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000)).
85. Id. 1 12, 61 P.3d at 181. In order to understand how the presumptions could be applied, it can be
supposed that, if permission had been granted originally, the court should continue to consider the plaintiffs' usage
permissive unless the plaintiffs could present evidence that pemlission had been revoked. f pcrmission was not
granted but the plaintiffs established all the other elements of a prescriptive claim, they then would have been
entitled to a presumption of adversity.
86. Id.
87. 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646 (1937).
88. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 12, 61 P.3d at 181 (quoting Hester, 41 N.M. at 505, 71 P.2d at 651
(emphasis added)).
89. Id. 13, 61 P.3d at 181. Here, the supreme court discussed the shifting of procedural responsibilities of
the parties. First, assuming all other elements of the prescriptive easement claim are met, the trier of fact may
presume adversity and it is up to the landowner to rebut such a presumption with evidence of permission, either
express or implied. Id. Once done, however, the burden shifts back to the claimant to establish the condition of
adversity by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
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The court quickly dismissed any evidence of permission derived from the Sutin
defendants, stating that such permission was impossible considering the Sutins'
admission that they did not even know that the plaintiffs were using their property.9"
Notwithstanding this admission on the part of the Sutins, evidence of permission
was available in relation to other defendant families, specifically the Alleys. 9' As an
example of actions consistent with permission, some of the plaintiffs testified that
they would greet and talk with people who lived in the area.92 One witness even
testified that, in the 1940s, the previous owner of the Sutin tract gave the entire
neighborhood permission to cross their land.93
Relying on the presumption that usage originating in permission remains
permissive, the district court had determined that the presumption of adversity had
been sufficiently rebutted by the actions of the plaintiffs and the permission granted
by the Sutins' predecessor in interest.94 Accordingly, the use of Elfego Road, at least
until the erection of fences and gates by defendants in the mid- 1990s, was found to
have always been permissive.95 Absent additional evidence of an act on the part of
the plaintiffs, which would have notified the defendants of a claim of right hostile
to their interests in the land, the supreme court ruled that the district court was at
liberty to weigh the evidence of permission more heavily than the presumption of
adversity. 96
The court further stipulated that the district court may have ruled partially on a
second exception to the presumption of adversity known as the "neighbor
accommodation exception." 97 Largely in response to the expansive and sparsely
populated nature of the state, the court in Algermissen noted that New Mexico law
has carved out this exception to the presumption of adversity when the "claimed
right-of-way traverses large bodies of open, unenclosed, and sparsely populated
privately-owned land., 98 The supreme court wasted little time in pointing out the
neighborhood accommodation exception's lack of relevancy in the case at hand. 99
First, that exception was shown "to apply only to 'large bodies of unenclosed
land.. .where the owners thereof could not reasonably know of passings over said
lands.' "' Here, it was undisputed that many of the defendant landowners knew of

90. Id. 1 14, 61 P.3d at 182.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. 15, 61 P.3d at 182.
95. Id.
96. Id. It should additionally be noted that this is only a portion of the finding. The presumption of adversity
applies when all of the other elements of an easement by prescription are met. Id. 1 11, 61 P.3d at 181. Even if the
district court did not weigh the defendants' rebuttal evidence more heavily than the presumption of adversity, had
it seen fit to deny another element of the prescriptive easement claim, one can suppose the presumption would have
been likewise defeated.
97. Id. 16, 61 P.3d at 182.
98. Id. (quoting Scholes v. Post Office Canyon Ranch, Inc., 115 N.M. 410, 412, 852 P.2d 683, 685 (1992)
(citation omitted)).
99. Id. 17,61 P.3d at 182.
100. Id. (quoting Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 279-80, 175 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1946)). The court also
cited Village of Capitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524, 525, 632 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1981), as an example of a case in
which the neighbor accommodation exception did not apply in a populated subdivision. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC001, 17,61 P.3d at 182.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

the plaintiffs' usage of Elfego Road.' For those defendants Who were unaware of
this usage, the court further stated that they could have reasonably learned of such
usage. 2 Secondly, and more importantly, resort to the neighbor accommodation
exception was not necessary as there was enough evidence to support the district
court's holding based on findings of permissive usage alone. 3
C. Knowledgefrom Open and Notorious Use
The first significant change in analysis between the traditional approach and the
one adopted by the court in Algermissen relates to the elements of open and
notorious usage." 4 According to the court, these elements are the exclusive methods
by which the landowner can be imputed with knowledge. 5 The court found
noteworthy that the elements of open and notorious usage have frequently been
treated as distinct and went to some length to point out that this treatment is
divergent from the characterization, of these terms by the Restatement. 6 This
procedural conflict was easily reconciled by the court's treating "open" and
"notorious" not as distinct elements of a prescriptive claim, but as two interrelated
same requirement-that the landowner have knowledge of
descriptors of 0the
7
claimant's use.

These distinctions are no longer important as the court formally rejected the
conjunctive approach in its application and adopted the Restatement's rationale that
the terms "are all part of the same requirement."'0 8 The court held that a finding that
usage was open or notorious would satisfy the claimant's requirement because both

21, 61 P.2d at 183. Furthermore, it is not likely that the court
101. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,
considered Albuquerque remote, unenclosed, or sparsely populated.
17, 61 P.3d at 182. The court noted that the defendants offered another "trigger" of the
102. Id.
neighborhood accommodation exception-that such exception applies when a "generally friendly neighborhood
attitude exists." Id. 17 n.2, 61 P.3d at 182 n.2. However, the court did not resort to the neighbor accommodation
exception in making its decision and so did not rule on the validity of this second potential condition. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. 19, 61 P.3d at 183 ("The Restatement simplifies or rationalizes the [traditional] definition of a
prescriptive easement by acknowledging that [open' and notorious] are [both] part of the same requirement.")
(citations omitted).
105. Id. 18, 61 P.3d at 183 (citing Silverstein v. Byers, 114N.M. 745, 748, 845 P.2d 839, 842 (Ct. App.
1992)).
106. "The Restatement uses the terms 'open' and 'notorious' in the disjunctive ('open or notorious'), while
our cases have repeatedly used them conjunctively ('open and notorious')." Id. 19 n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 n.3.
107. Id. 18, 61 P.3d at 182-83. This does not mean that "open" and "notorious" can be given equivalent
itmay also mean thatiti.i
meanings. "'Open' generally means that the use is not made in secret or stealthily.
or apparent. 'Notorious' generally means that the use is actually known to the owner, or is widely known in the
neighborhood." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERvrrUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000).
108. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,1 19 & n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 & n.3. The court inAIgermissen claimed that
the disjunctive approach, now formally adopted, was already the law of New Mexico. Id.1 19, 61 P.3d at 183. The
court cited two cases to demonstrate how "open" has been manipulated. Id.(citing Silverstein, 114 N.M. at 748, 845
P.2d at 842 (holding that frequent use of a road was so plainly apparent that the requirement of open and notorious
use was satisfied); Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 280, 175 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1946) (holding that use of a
relatively narrow strip of land, adjacent to the landowner's residence, in the presence of the landowner satisfied this
requirement)). Likewise, an additional case was included to demonstrate the historical application of "notorious."
Id. (citing Cunningham v. Otero County Elec. Coop., Inc., 114 N.M. 739, 742, 845 P.2d 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that, when landowner actually saw a power line, the open and notorious requirement was satisfied)).
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actual knowledge of usage and knowledge that a reasonable owner should have
possessed are adequate to create the easement.109
The supreme court pointed out that the district court did not make specific
fmdings of fact related to open or notorious use.' 10 Rather, in accordance with the
new spirit of application, a good deal of evidence related to whether or not the
plaintiffs' manner of use could be interpreted to endow defendants with knowledge
of that use was taken by the court." l ' First, in relation to the Sutin defendants, the
supreme court's prior findings already established that the Sutins were unable to
grant permission due to a lack of knowledge that plaintiffs were traversing their
property." 2 Even for the other defendants who were on the land regularly, the
district court had found that the plaintiffs "who used Elfego Road were 'not readily
distinguishable from the property owners and their guests and invitees."'113 The
supreme court reasoned that this factor, combined with the brief amount of time it
would take individual plaintiffs to cross the property, and the heavily wooded nature
of the property, could have been taken into account by the district court." 4
Naturally, contrasting facts were also taken into evidence, including a concession
by the Alleys that they actually saw three of the plaintiffs using the trail." 5 Still, in
accordance with the information taken above, the district court reached the finding
that the public users the Alleys saw were indistinguishable from the landowners on
Elfego Road and their guests." 6
The Alleys' difficulty identifying the plaintiffs' use proved instructive and
allowed the supreme court to reach the same result for the Sutin defendants." 7 The
court found that the Sutins' lack of actual knowledge was not sufficient to
undermine the establishment of open or notorious usage on its own." 8 As discussed
above, knowledge that a reasonable landowner should have had is enough to serve
as constructive notice of prescriptive usage.' 19 In light of findings related to the
difficulty had by the Alleys, who were present in the neighborhood during the
prescriptive period, the supreme court concluded that the district court could have
rationally found that the Sutins would not have had knowledge of the plaintiffs'
usage of their land even had they been more diligent. 20 Thus, the supreme court
held that it could not make a finding of open or notorious use if knowledge were not
imputed to the defendants.' 2 '

109. Id. 1 19 n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 n.3.
110. Id. 20, 61 P.3d at 183.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. 21, 61 P.3d at 183.
116. Id.
117. Id. 120, 61 P.3d at 183.
118. Id. 21,61 P.3dat 183-84.
119. See supranotes 108-109 and accompanying text.
120. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 121, 61 P.3d at 183-84.
121. Id. 22, 61 P.3d at 184. Ironically, after spending a good deal of time on the new disjunctive standard,
the court still disqualified both elements specifically in a conjunctive way: "The use by the public was not apparent,
and it was not of such a character that it was widely known in the neighborhood." Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Continuous and UninterruptedUse
Although the plaintiffs' failure to prove any element of a prescriptive easement
claim would have been sufficient to defeat their cause of action,'22 the supreme court
chose to address the remaining elements. Like the concepts of "open" and
"notorious," the terms "continuous" and "uninterrupted" were interpreted by the
court to be less than synonymous, but closely related elements of the same
requirement.123 The court determined that continuity is to be examined in relation
to claimants' behavior and the nature of their usage; evaluating whether that usage
is interrupted calls for examination of the landowners' conduct. 124 Taken together,
the usage relied upon to support a claimant's contention cannot be sporadic, random,
or arbitrary; rather, to create an easement by prescription, the use must be normal
and allowed to persist for the prescriptive period. 2
Therefore, under the court's analysis, defining "normal" became a critical
component in supporting the plaintiffs' claim. 26 The court cited to the standard
articulated in Maloney v. Wreyford,127 which held that "normal" means reasonably
frequent use of the property, whenever needed, and in a manner corresponding to
the natural use of such a property. 21 In Algermissen, the plaintiffs' claim that they
used the alleged easement continuously was, for the most part, not disputed by the
defendants.1 29 Rather, the defendants anchored their arguments in continuity's sister
element, interruption.13
Interruption, as stated above, requires action on the part of the owner and takes
one of two forms: (1) a physical interruption or (2) a legal action to halt usage.' 3'
Naturally, an effective interruption will have the corollary effect of breaking the
continuity of the plaintiffs' usage.'3 2 The Alleys made a claim that a physical
interruption was made in 1992 or 1993 when they fenced off their driveway, forcing
travelers to divert from the traditional route and move along the Sutin property
instead. '3 The court responded by labeling34 this shift "slight" and refusing to
characterize it as an "effective" interruption.
Unable to reach a finding of effective interruption, the court examined a second
feature of continuity: a showing that the path traveled remains constant. 35 The

122. See supra Part IV.A.
123. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-O01,
23, 61 P.3d at 184 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 2.17(2) (2000) ("A servitude is created by a prescriptive use of land.. if the prescriptive use
is.. continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period.")).
124. Id. (citing Maloney v. Wreyford, 111 N.M. 221, 224, 804 P.2d 412,415 (Ct. App. 1990)).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. 1II N.M. 22i, 804 P.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1990).
128. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 23, 61 P.3d at 184 (citing Maloney, 11 N.M. at 224, 804 P.2d at 415
("The general requirement of continuity has been construed using a reasonableness standard. Continuity is to be
determined in relation to the right claimed, and is sufficient if the property is used whenever needed, if it is
reasonably frequent.") (citation omitted)).
129. Id. 124,61 P.3dat 184.
130. Id.
131. Id. 23, 61 P.3d at 184 (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. 24, 61 P.3d at 184.
134. Id.
135. Id. 125,61 P.3d at 184.
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supreme court traced this requirement back to Hesterand noted that the district court
had found that this element was lacking.' 36 Notably, the plaintiffs did not even
attempt to define the dimensional scope of their claim or provide a specific location
for the easement, but rather relied on the court to create such an easement based on
the evidence presented.' 3 7 Considering the lack of evidence in support of Plaintiffs'
position and its previous findings related to the other elements of the prescriptive
38
claim, the court declined to reevaluate the trial court's holding on this point.1
E. Holding
The supreme court found sufficient evidence that each of the district court's
findings with regard to the elements of the plaintiffs' prescriptive easement claim
was rational.' 39 As a result, the supreme court declined to address any other element
of the plaintiffs' pleading and denied the specific plaintiffs, and the public, any
rights to an easement by prescription."
V. ANALYSIS
According to Professor Susan French,' 41 the "Restatement presents a comprehensive modem treatment of the law of servitudes that substantially simplifies and
clarifies one of the most complex and archaic bodies of 20th century American
law.' ' 42 This simplification aims to make the law "more useful to developers,
owners in common interest communities, local governments, conservation and
historic preservation organizations, and other land owners.' 43 This does seem to be
the intention of the New Mexico Supreme Court in the Algermissen decision.'"
However, in its attempt to clarify the law in New Mexico, the supreme court also
raised several novel questions about how easement law is applied in the state and the
policy support for that application. Unfortunately, the method by which these

136. Id. "A way claimed by prescription must be a definite, certain, and precise strip of land....To acquire
a prescriptive right of way by consent and uninterrupted use, the use must relate strictly to the identical land over
which the right is claimed." Id. (quoting Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 506, 71 P.2d 646, 652 (1937)). It should
be noted that more recent holdings have not been narrow in their construction of the precise path standard. In
Silverstein v. Byers, the court of appeals noted that "slight divergence would not defeat such [a] right, especially
so, where such slight divergency was not the voluntary act of the preemptor, but due to force of circumstances
beyond his control, and the result of acts and conduct of the adverse party." 114 N.M. 745, 749, 845 P.2d 839, 843
(Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Murffv. Dreeben, 127 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939)).
137. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 25, 61 P.3d at 184. The court noted that, if all the other elements of
a prescriptive easement claim had been met, remand would have been appropriate in order to make these
determinations. Id. However, due to its disposition on the other elements of the claim, remand was not necessary.
Id.
138. See id.
139. Id. 127,61 P.3d at 185.
140. Id.
141. Professor Susan F. French was the Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
(2000).
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § Scope (2000).

143.

Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP.

PROB. & TR. J. 225, 242 (2000).

144. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 10, 61 P.3d at 180 ("We believe that this is an appropriate time
to consolidate these elements into a more succinct and less redundant test for determining when a court should grant
a prescriptive easement. In doing so, we follow the example of the recently published RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (2000).").
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questions were raised further convolutes the already murky waters of easement law
and severely prejudices plaintiffs who would attempt to vindicate prescriptive
rights.'45 Not only is the traditional law not clarified, but the decision can be seen to
raise challenges heretofore not faced by litigants in prescriptive easement cases.' 46
A. Public versus PrivateEasements
1. Considerations Unique to Public Easements
The plaintiffs in Algermissen, although not a government entity, sought a public
easement by prescription, a scenario which the New Mexico Supreme Court
admitted created "unique analytical problems."' 14 7 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized the public's right to acquire a physical easement over private land
pursuant to a state's power of eminent domain. 48 The Restatement concurs and
extends this possibility to acquisition by prescription but acknowledges theoretical
challenges faced by the courts.141
Although most jurisdictions recognize that use by the public can lead to
prescriptive rights, 5 ' those rights have commonly been limited to highways and
beaches. 5 ' While this, alone, did not undermine the plaintiffs' claim to a public
easement in Algermissen, there are several complications that weaken their claim.
These complications lead to questions relating to the nature of the land itself, actions
taken by local municipalities, and the nature of the public's usage.' 52
The nature of the land in question is important because many courts have found
mere usage insufficient to establish a presumption of adverse use when the traversed

145. See infra Part VI.
146. See infra Part VI.
147. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 10, 61 P.3d at 180.
148. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (holding that a state may create public
easements across private land when the state proceeds pursuant to its power of eminent domain). The states' power
of eminent domain is subject to the limitations of the Takings Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion
of the Takings Clause and the complexity it presents to an analysis of public easements, both under federal and New
Mexico law, see infra Part V.A.2.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 & cmt. f(2000).
Courts that used a statute-of-limitations-based theory of prescription faced the problem that use
by the public created multiple causes of action against various individuals, but no cause of action
against the public. Courts that used the lost-grant theory faced the problem that the grant
required a definite grantee. Most courts got around these theoretical difficulties either by
ignoring them or by adopting an implied-dedication theory.
Id. § 2.18 cmt. f.
150. See, e.g., Weidner v. Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 1993) (holding
that a public way may be created by public use of private property for the ten-year prescriptive period); Limestone
Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 672 N.E.2d 763, 768 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the public could acquire an
easement by prescription pursuant to the Illinois Highway Code).
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f (2000). In fact, several states have statutes
providing that public use of a road for a certain amount of time creates a public highway. See, e.g., 605 IDAHO CODE
§ 40-202 (2004); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-202 (1993). Other states have utilized this doctrine to recognize public rights
to beaches. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla. 1974) ("It is possible for
the public to acquire an easement in the beaches of the State by the finding of a prescriptive right to the beach
land."); Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 127 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1986) (awarding the public an
easement by prescription for usage of heavily traversed beach property along the Gulf of Mexico).
152. See infra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
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land is open, wooded, or unimproved." 3 This theory is grounded in the policy that
landowners who are not currently utilizing specific tracts of land should not be
required to incur the expense of otherwise unnecessary affirmative action to prevent
the creation of a public road on their land." This seems to be the rule in New
Mexico, as evidenced by the supreme court's acknowledgment of the neighbor
accommodation exception to the general presumption of adversity.' 5
In light of this recognition, the court in Algermissen properly interpreted the
purpose of the neighbor accommodation exception in denying the defendants'
reliance on that doctrine.' 6 The land in question was developed (as evidenced by the
number of private residences located on it), was not remote (being within the city
limits of Albuquerque), and was of such a character that it did not prevent
landowners from learning of the plaintiffs' activities on their land." 7
The defendants in Algermissen also argued that the plaintiffs' claim to a right-ofway must fail because of the recreational nature of the plaintiffs' use.' While New
Mexico cases are silent on this issue, the Restatement cautions that most
jurisdictions "have been reluctant to recognize prescriptive rights to recreational
uses other than on beaches."'5 9 Additionally, cases in other jurisdictions suggest that
in instances of casual-recreational usage, license, 60 rather than prescription, might
be inferred.' 6' The supreme court in Algermissen declined to rule on this question,
but made it clear
that it saw no policy reason to apply such an inference in New
62
Mexico cases. 1

63
While public easements for roadway purposes can be established in most states, 1
some jurisdictions require government participation, in addition to simple public

153. See, e.g., Ford v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 392 So. 2d 217, 218-19 (Ala. 1980) ("(W]here the road runs
over unimproved or 'turned out' lands there is no presumption of dedication by mere use; rather there is a
presumption of permissiveuse and the user must establish his use as adverse to that of the owner."); Stevens County
v. Burrus, 40 P.2d 125, 127 (Wash. 1935) ("[W]here the land is unenclosed.. .vacant and unoccupied, the mere
travel across it without objection from the owners does not enable the public to acquire a public road or highway
over it.").

154. Ala. By-Products Corp., 392 So. 2d at 219.
155. See, e.g., Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276,279-80, 175 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1946) (holding the neighbor
accommodation exception expressly limited to large, unenclosed tracts of land); Scholes v. Post Office Canyon, Inc.,
115 N.M. 410,410-11,852 P.2d 683,683-84 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the neighbor accommodation exception
does not apply to fenced land); see also supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
156. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-O01, 17,61 P.3d at 182; accordVill. ofCapitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524,
525, 632 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1981) (declining to apply the exception to a relatively small tract in a populated
subdivision).
157. See supra Part IV. The supreme court's commentary on the neighbor accommodation exception in
Algermissen is dicta. Although the court performed a brief analysis and determined that the exception would not
apply, the court stated that "resort to this exception is unnecessary, because we hold that substantial [other] evidence
supported the district court's finding of permissive usage." Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 17, 61 P.3d at 182.
158. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 26, 61 P.3d at 184-85.
159.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVTrUDES § 2.18 cmt. f(2000).

160. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004) (defining license as "an agreement...that it is lawful for
the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal").
161. See, e.g., Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 785 (Alaska 1987) (holding that landowner's failure to object
to casual use by sightseers and hunters did not equivocate a dedication to public use); Anderson v. Felten, 612 P.2d
216, 218 (Nev. 1980) (attributing occasional use by skiers, hikers, and hunters to license).
162. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 126,61 P.3d at 185 ("[T]here is no support in our cases for such a rule,
and the arguments in this case provide no policy basis to create one.").
163. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
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usage, in order to do so."6 This element of the plaintiffs' claim in Algermissen was
not explored by the supreme court's opinion, although the court did point out that
Elfego Road was created as a private easement and was not claimed or maintained
by any municipality.'65 The court's acknowledgment of this fact indicates that the
extent of governmental involvement might be relevant in a future case.
2. The Role of the Takings Clause
The potential for the New Mexico Supreme Court to be concerned about a lack
of government involvement in establishing a public easement is evident in the
Algermissen opinion. The opinion's treatment of the defendants' argument that a
public prescriptive easement would amount to an uncompensated violation of the
Takings Clause166 makes this apparent. Although the court did not address the
constitutional claim, it did point out that such an analysis would be complicated by
the fact that no government entity was a party to the action, and deciding who
should compensate the landowners would be impossible.' 67 However, another case,
Luevano v. Maestas,1 set precedent on this issue in New Mexico by adopting the
Restatement's position that "[a]cquisition by prescription is not a taking and does
'
not require compensation to the landowner for the servitude."169
Despite the court of appeals' position in Luevano, it does not appear that the rule
on whether a prescriptive acquisition by the public requires compensation is fully
settled in New Mexico. 70 The supreme court in Algermissen referred to the position
of the court in Luevano only as a "general rule" and cited for comparison Pascoag
Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island,17' a Federal District of Rhode Island case,
which takes a contrary view.' 72
The application of a Takings Clause analysis to a prescriptive claim in Pascoag
was a matter of first impression for the federal courts. 1 73 The Pascoag decision
stands for the proposition that matters of property law (which allow acquisition of
private property without compensation) and constitutional law (which require
compensation when private property is taken for public uses) are not mutually

164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f(2000); see, e.g., Bruno v. Evans, 408 S.E.2d
458, 461 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) ("[U]se by the public of a road without acceptance of that road by legitimate public
authority will not support a claim of public road by prescription.") (emphasis omitted); Schroeder v. Urban, 766
P.2d 188, 190 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that positive action on the part of public officials, such as improving
or maintaining a road, is necessary to sustain a finding of the public's intent to establish a public easement).
165. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 4, 61 P.3d at 179.
166. Id. 26, 61 P.3d at 185. "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see also N.M. CONST. art. I1, § 20 ("Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.").
167. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 26, 61 P.3d at 185.
168. 117 N.M. 580, 874 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1994).
169. Id. at 587, 874 P.2d at 795 (quoting Draft RESTATEMENT § 2.18 cmt. e (Apr. 5, 1993)); accord
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. f (2000).

170. See infra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
171. 217 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.R.I. 2002), affd, 337 F.3d 87 (lst Cir. 2003).
172. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 26, 61 P.3d at 185 (citing Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 217-27).
173. Pascoag, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 217. The Pascoagdecision has subsequently been affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003), and denied certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court, 540 U.S. 1090 (2003).
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exclusive.174 The U.S. Supreme Court clearly stated in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal
occupation for the
Commission175 that a public easement is a permanent physical
176
and Fourteenth 177
purposes of establishing a per se taking under the Fifth
Amendments. 78 With this understanding, Pascoag directly addressed the unique
quagmire faced by landowners subject to prescriptive claims by the public.
[I]n the case of a prescriptive easement, the record owner could bring an action
for trespass and ejection. There is no property interest, yet, that has been taken
away from the record owner. Therefore, there has been no taking prior to the
completion of the statutory period .... If the takings clock were to stop at the
moment the adverse possession clock has run, then the record owner as against
the government is in a curious Catch-22 situation. He or she had no takings
claim prior to the completion of the adverse possession prescription period, but
would be similarly barred from having a takings claim after the period was
completed. This Court does not sanction this bonanza for the government at the
intersection of property law and constitutional law. 7 9
It was the contention of the court in Pascoag that the simple fact that adverse
possession and prescription are well-settled, ancient tenets of state law does not
exempt them from constitutional mandates. 8 0
Even if the New Mexico Supreme Court had fully accepted the Pascoagdoctrine,
it is still doubtful that the court would have found an unconstitutional taking in the
Algermissen case.' 8' In order to sustain a claim under the Takings Clause, a
landowner must prove three elements: (1) a government taking of private
property,'82 (2) the taking was without just compensation," 3 and (3) the taking was
effected for a public purpose.' While it can be argued that the defendants in
Algermissen made a showing of insufficient compensation for the taking of a
recognized property interest intended to benefit the public, the first element of the
analysis is clouded by the lack of a municipality as a party to the litigation and a
failure to show the transfer of title in an easement to a government entity. 85 Finally,
applying the logic of Pascoagis predicated on the defendants asserting a takings

174. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
175. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
176. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
177. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
178. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 ("We think a 'permanent physical occupation' has occurred, for purposes of that
rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon
the premises.").
179. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
180. Id. at 225.
181. See infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
182. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
("[G]overnment action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the 'constitutional obligation
to pay just compensation."') (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
183. Id. at 315.
184. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984) (discussing the public use requirement).
185. See supra note 60.
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claim under federal law and within the context of the Federal Constitution.'8 6 Such
matters are not controlling over the New Mexico Supreme Court, especially in cases
where the landowner's argument is based on the Takings Clause of the New Mexico
Constitution,8 7which bears slight textual differences from that of its federal
counterpart.1
B. Use of Presumptions
The New Mexico Supreme Court arrived at its decision in Algermissen by
utilizing a series of common law presumptions in order to reach fmdings related to
the adverse nature of the plaintiffs' use of the claimed easement. 88 These
presumptions are intended to compensate for the difficulty of proving usage -over a
period of time.' 89 Regrettably, the court in Algermissen applied these presumptions
in an inconsistent manner, and thereby diluted their usefulness.
The Restatement takes no official position on these presumptions, although it
does acknowledge the frequency of their application and the effect they have on case
law across all jurisdictions. 9 ° New Mexico, like many American jurisdictions,
begins with the assumption that unexplained usage that meets all the other
traditional elements of prescription is adverse. 9 ' The counter to this presumption is
the servient tenement owner's ability to overcome it with rebuttal evidence.' 92 The
Restatement addresses four categories of rebuttal evidence, which the Algermissen
court could have applied.'93
The first category addressed by the Restatement was actually considered by the
Algermissen court: evidence that the land in question was wild, vacant, and
unenclosed. 94 New Mexico's neighbor accommodation exception' 9 seems to be in
line with the philosophy held by many jurisdictions that when the servient estate is
in a sparse, natural, and unenclosed condition the presumption of adversity is

186. Pascoag,217 F. Supp. 2d 206, was a federal court case tried under federal law in the District of Rhode
Island. As such, the New Mexico Supreme Court is not bound by its holding.
187. See supra note 166.
188. See supra Part 1V.B. Although the court went to the trouble of pointing out that these presumptions
"have no mandatory effect upon (a] decision," Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 11, 61 P.3d at 181 (quoting
Mortgage nv. Co. of El Paso v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240,244, 771 P.2d 173, 177 (1989)), they are relied upon heavily
in affirming the analysis of the district court. Id.T 11-17, 61 P.3d at 181-82.
189. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000).
191. See Vill. of Capitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524, 525, 632 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1981); Sanchez v. Dale
Bellamah Homes of N.M., Inc., 76 N.M. 526, 529, 417 P.2d 25, 27 (1996); see also, e.g., United States v. 43.12
Acres of Land, 554 F. Supp. 1039, 1041 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("[Olnce the claiming party establishes that the use was
open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted for the ten year period, a presumption is raised that the use was
adverse and under a claim of right...."); Greenco, Inc. v. May, 506 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) ("The party
asserting the prescriptive right may make a prima facie case by showing an open and continuous use of another's
land with the owner['s] knowledge, creating a rebuttable presumption that such use is adverse and under a claim
of right.") (citations omitted).
192. See supra note 89.
193. The four categories are: (1) evidence that the land is wild, vacant, and unenclosed; (2) evidence that the
right-of-way was built and used by the owner; (3) evidence of a close relationship between claimant and landowner;
and (4) evidence of a local custom of neighborly accommodation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 2.16, Reporter's Note, cmts. g, a-d (2000).
194. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
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overcome.' 96 Furthermore, the court's denial of a neighbor accommodation exception claim in Algermissen is in line with other jurisdictions that narrowly apply such
exceptions only to cases where the servient estate is truly remote and unimproved.' 97
One exception to the assumption of non-permissive use not considered by the
court in Algermissen was evidence that the road was built by the owner of the
claimed servient estate and used by the owner during the claimed prescriptive
period.' 98 In some states, this exception further dilutes the presumption of adversity
by simply requiring that the road existed when the alleged adverse use began.'"
Under the former standard, had the other elements of the prescriptive claim in
Algermissen been met, it would have been up to the defendants to show evidence of
their construction of Elfego Road to meet this exception. Under the latter standard,
the usage of the plaintiffs in Algermissen could never have been presumed adverse
without the plaintiffs providing evidence that the public traversed the defendants'
property before the construction of Elfego Road.
The remaining two exceptions to the general presumption of adversity are
interrelated, although only one was addressed in the Algermissen decision.2 °" These
exceptions are met when there is a close relationship between the claimant and the
owner of the servient estate and when a local custom of neighborly accommodation
exists.2"' In order to find-permissive use, the district court in Algernissen pointed to
evidence of friendly relationships between defendant family, the Alleys, and several
plaintiffs.2" 2 The supreme court, in examining the findings of the district court,
classified this evidence as fitting into the category of close relationships, but did not
address the defendants' argument that a local custom of neighbor accommodation

196. See Matsu v. Chavez, 96 N.M. 775, 779, 635 P.2d 584, 588 (1981) (holding presumption of adversity
will be overcome only where large bodies of open and unenclosed land preclude owner from reasonably being
expected to be aware of use); see also Stahl v. Thompson, 641 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) ("The use of
wild, unenclosed, and unimproved land is presumed to be permissive....").
197. See, e.g., Carpenter-Union Hills Cemetery Ass'n v. Camp Zoe, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 196, 202-03 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (finding exception to presumption not sustainable when road claimed passes adjacent to "farm homes
and buildings, two school houses, a hay field, [a] cemetery..., fenced areas, and at least one large cultivated field");
Shepard v. Gilbert, 249 N.W. 54, 56 (Wis. 1933) (limiting the exception to the presumption of adversity "to lands
that are wild, unoccupied, or of so little present use as to lead legitimately to the inference that an owner would have
no motive in excluding persons from passing over the land").
198. This omission may simply have been due to a lack of evidence in the factual record. While the opinion
did mention that Elfego Road is used "by the people who live and work along it," it did not contain any information
about its creation except to say that it was "created as a private easement for ingress and egress over private
property." Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 4, 61 P.3d at 179.
199. RESTATEMENT (THmRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 Reporter's Note, cmts. g, b (2000); see, e.g.,
Melendez v. Hintz, 724 P.2d 137, 140 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an owner overcomes the presumption
of adverse use when he constructs a pathway for his own use, and the use of others in no way interferes with the
owner's use); Jackson v. Hicks, 604 P.2d 105, 106 (Nev. 1979) ("Where a roadway is established or maintained by
a landowner for his own use, the fact that his neighbor also makes use of it, under circumstances which in no way
interfere with use by the landowner himself, does not create a presumption of adverseness.") (quoting Turrillas v.
Quilici, 303 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Nev. 1956)).
200. See infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Chaconas v. Meyers, 465 A.2d 379, 384 (D.C. 1983) (finding that a property owner who was
always friendly and who had restrained his dog to allow neighbors to pass over his property had rebutted the
presumption of adversity); Burns v. Plachecki, 223 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn.. 1974) (presuming permissive use due
to close family relationship between the parties); Greenwalt Family Trust v. Kehler, 885 P.2d 421,425 (Mont. 1994)
(denying presumption of adversity when a community understanding exists).
202. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, It 5, 14, 61 P.3d at 179, 182. Some plaintiffs, themselves, testified that
they often greeted people who lived in the area and would "stop and chat." Id. 1 14, 61 P.3d at 182.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35

should likewise defeat the presumption of adversity. 2 3 Perhaps in future cases,
where evidence of express permission is not found, this interpretation of the
neighbor accommodation exception will be persuasive in New Mexico courts.
Finally, it is important to consider that there are several jurisdictions that do not
employ any general presumptions at all. 2 4 In these jurisdictions, various other
factors are given effect. 2 5 The considerations range from an analysis of the intent
of the servient estate's owner20 6 to a general burden of proof placed on one or both
of the parties.2 7 Considering the pedigree of the presumptions as fictions created to
allow the common law to continue tracing easement rights back to time immemorial,
it could be deemed truer to the spirit of the Restatement to discard the presumptions
as archaic remnants of a bygone era. In cases like Algermissen, where the claims go
back no further than the 1940s, it may be fairer to simply hold litigants to a
preponderance of the evidence standard and let the trial courts resolve matters based
on the facts put before them.
C. Open and Notorious in the Disjunctive
A collateral effect of the consolidation of the elements for prescriptive easements
may be that plaintiffs find it increasingly difficult to meet the elements that remain.
As discussed earlier, the Restatement attempts to simplify the law of servitudes in
order to better serve the interests at play in modem uses of land.20 ' One clear
example of this effort is the amalgamation of the traditional elements of "open" and
"notorious" into dual components of a single requirement that a landowner have
knowledge of the prescriptive use.20 9 In accordance with the theme of the new
Restatement, the purpose of this requirement "is to give the owner of the servient
estate ample
opportunity to protect against the establishment of prescriptive
' 210
rights.
As incorporated by the Algermissen opinion, the terms have traditionally been
stated conjunctively, but are actually disjunctive in their application.2 ' In order to
meet the policy objective of the new Restatement (protection of the servient estate
owner), this is the proper interpretation of these elements. Furthermore, the court in
Algermissen claimed that this interpretation was in accordance with the traditional
approach in New Mexico. 1 2 By drawing a distinction between "open" and
"notorious," the Restatement simply replaces those elements with a notice

203. Id. 17 n.2, 61 P.3d at 182 n.2. ("[A] fuller discussion of [the neighbor accommodation exception] is
unnecessary here. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the use was permissive,
without the need to resort to [this exception].").
204. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2. i6 cmt. g (2000).
205. See infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
206. See Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296,304 (Alaska 1985) (remanding in an effort to determine if landowner
intended to permit use of disputed roadway).
207. See Reynolds v. Soffer, 459 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Conn. 1983) ("[A]lthough the burden of proof is on the
party claiming a prescriptive easement there is no presumption of permissive use to be overcome. All that is
required is a showing by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the use was adverse.") (citations omitted).
208. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVrTUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000).
211. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 9 19 n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 n.3.
212. See supra note 108.
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requirement imposed upon the claimant of the easement.213 Actual knowledge
suffices even when activities are not open and notorious,2t 4 and open
215 activity
satisfies the requirement even when neighbors have no knowledge of it.
The knowledge requirement is also related to the traditional common law element
of continuity. "Sporadic and casual uses are generally not open or notorious, '216 and
while a use need not be constant,21 7 it must be open or notorious enough to be
capable of conveying knowledge to the landowner that a prescriptive right is being
claimed. 218 Additionally, claimants asserting a right-of-way must confine their path
to a precise and regular course in order that the owner of the servient tenement can
determine accurately what is actually being claimed.2 19
The degree of precision required, unfortunately, is not a hard standard and both
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Algermissen22' and the Restatemen?2 ' leave it
open to individual courts to interpret based on the nature of the easement claimed
and the facts of the case. While claims for a right-of-way "must be based on... a
regular route, ' ' 2 22 slight alterations based on circumstances are occasionally
permitted based on the party making the change, 223 the extent ofthe deviation, 224 and

213. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 19 & n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 & n.3. It should be noted that constructive
notice will suffice. See id. 19 n.3, 61 P.3d at 183 n.3. Constructive notice has long been an acceptable substitute
for actual knowledge in actions concerning real property in New Mexico. See Taylor v. Hanchett Oil Co., 37 N.M.
606, 609, 27 P.2d 59, 60 (1933) ("'Knowledge' does not necessarily mean 'actual knowledge,' but means
knowledge of such circumstances as would ordinarily lead upon [reasonable] investigation.. .to a knowledge of the
actual facts....In its broadest interpretation it means constructive notice.").
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000); see Cataldo v. Grappone, 381 A.2d
1194, 1196 (N.H. 1977) (holding that actual knowledge on the part of the landowner is equivalent to a showing of
open and notorious usage) (citing Pease v. Whitney, 98 A. 62, 64 (N.H. 1916)).
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000); see Swift v. Kniffen, 706 P.2d 296,
304 (Alaska 1985) (holding that owners are imputed with knowledge a duly alert owner would possess).
216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000).
217. Usage must generally conform to the "normal" usage of the land in question. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co.
v. Vernon, 697 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Me. 1997) (holding intermittent use for logging operations sufficient to establish
easement by prescription); Ellison v. Fellows, 437 A.2d 278, 280 (N.H. 1981) (holding that use of an easement to
haul hay was continuous when its use was limited to haying season).
218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000). See S.D. Warren Co., 697 A.2d at
1282 ("Intermittent use may be continuous for purposes of establishing a prescriptive easement if it is consistent
with the normal use that an owner of the property would make and is sufficiently open and notorious to give notice
to the [servient estate] owner....") (quoting Great N. Paper Co. v. Eldredge, 686 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Me. 1996)).
219. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. h (2000); see, e.g., Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic
Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 587 (Cal. 1984) ("[T]he existence of a prescriptive easement must be shown by a
definite and certain line of travel for the statutory period."); Oshita v. Hill, 308 S.E.2d 923, 926 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that, although a metes-and-bounds description is not necessary, the pathway claimed must be able
to be identified and located from the testimony given).
220. The supreme court's analysis of continuity in Algermissen is incomplete due to the plaintiffs' failure to
specify a precise path over which their claim rests (leaving it up to the court to create based on the court's power
in equity). 2003-NMSC-01, 1 25, 61 P.3d at 184. The supreme court did say that, had all the other elements of the
prescription claim been met, remand would have been appropriate to determine if a precise path existed. Id.
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. g (2000) (requiring use which is "reasonably
definite").
222. Id. § 2.17 cmt. h.
223. See Murffv. Dreeben, 127 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ("[A] slight divergence would not
defeat [a prescriptive] right, especially so, where such.. .divergency was not the voluntary act of the preemptor, but
due to... conduct of the adverse party.").
224. See Silverstein v. Byers, 114 N.M. 745, 749, 845 P.2d 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[S]light deviation[]
from the accustomed route will not defeat an easement...." (quoting Matthiessen v. Grand, 268 P. 675, 678 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1928))).
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even acts of nature. 225 The combined impact of these varying considerations is to
add a complicating effect to what was espoused by the court as a simplification of
easement analysis.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
This analysis raises the question of whether the newly clarified law announced
in Algermissen is discernibly different than the law of New Mexico before
Algermissen. Specifically, is the court's approach truly in the spirit of the
Restatement that the court purports to follow? Under the Restatement model, "an
easement by prescription is created by an adverse use of land, that is open or
notorious, and continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period
(of ten years). 2 2 6 The remainder of this Note will be dedicated to reconciling that
definition with the state of the law in New Mexico after Algermissen.
Common to both the traditional and modem definitions of prescription is the
element of adversity. 227 As discussed, the use of presumptions has historically been
critical in this analysis.228 Under the law announced in Hester,it is clear that a usage
that originates in permission cannot ripen into an adverse use without an overt act
of adversity on the part of the claimant. 229 However, absent evidence of permission,
Village of Capitan v. Kaywood"3 ° makes it likewise clear that in New Mexico
unexplained usage will be presumed adverse by default if all the other elements of
a prescriptive claim are met.23' In light of that default approach, the type of rebuttal
evidence that a property owner will be allowed to present to undermine the
presumption of adversity is equally important. A study of the Restatement
demonstrates that, in adopting an approach to presumptions, the New Mexico
Supreme Court had several alternatives.232 Determining whether the court chose
correctly when it chose to presume unexplained use as adverse requires looking to
the initial purposes of presumptions and the varying difficulties of their application
in modem settings.
With the adoption of the statute of limitations for adverse possession as
determining the requisite time for establishing a prescriptive use, much of the utility
of presumptive reasoning has been undermined. It is difficult to argue that New
Mexico's requirement that usage be proven for the relatively brief and finite period
225. Id. at 749-50, 845 P.2d at 843-44 (holding that a quarter-mile deviation in a roadway after a canyon
washout during the prescriptive period did not create a new prescriptive period).
10, 61 P.3d at 180 .(citing RESTATEMENT'(TH1RD) OF PROP.:
226. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,
SERVITUDES §§ 2.16-2.17 (2000)):
227. See supraPart IV.B for the New Mexico Supreme Court's analysis of adverse use in Algermissen.
228. Although the original purpose of presumptions was to allow courts to trace a prescriptive use back to
a time immemorial, see supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text, modem courts have also found them useful due
to the factual difficulty of proving a particular usage over any significant length of time when the original parties
may not be available. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
229. Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 505, 71 P.2d 646, 651 (1937).
230. 96 N.M. 524, 632 P.2d 1162 (1981).
231. Id. at 525,632 P.2d at 1163.
232. There are three logical approaches: (1) presumption that an unexplained use is adverse, (2) presumption
that an unexplained use is permissive, and (3) a decision not to employ presumptive reasoning. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000). Having chosen to presume that unexplained use is adverse,
New Mexico is also faced with determining what, if any, evidence is appropriate to rebut the presumption. See supra
Part V.B.
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of ten years233 requires reliance on fictions whose utility was necessitated solely by
a historic requirement that use be proven to time immemorial.23 4 Furthermore, the
application of New Mexico's presumption of adversity is beleaguered with
exceptions, each of which has its own doctrinal elements and specific case law. 235
Algermissen does little to alleviate these concerns or even to provide guidance as
to how practitioners should employ these presumptions in the future. Most critically,
the court in Algermissen varies the nature of the presumption employed with each
prescriptive element analyzed. The supreme court in Algermissen determined that
use by the plaintiffs had its inception in permission.236 Applying the presumption
that usage originating in permission is not adverse, the usage should have remained
permissive until an overt act on the part of the plaintiffs indicated that it was of
right.237 Yet, the court still analyzed the erection of fences by the defendants as
attempts to interrupt adverse usage.238
Conversely, if the court had presumed the plaintiffs' usage to be adverse,
contradictions would still be implicit. The court acknowledged that the neighbor
accommodation exception was not applicable because the defendants could have
reasonably discovered the plaintiffs' usage of their land.239 As a result, that
exception was not available as rebuttal evidence to the presumption of adversity.
Nevertheless, the court later determined that it was not irrational for the district court
to find that the circumstances of the plaintiffs' use made it such that knowledge
should not have been imputed to the defendants.24 °
The statutory period for the acquisition of an easement by prescription is ten
years in New Mexico. 241 The parties in Algermissen were able to provide evidence
as to the character of the use of Elfego Road back to the 1940s.242 There is no reason
to think that, as the length of time since significant development began in the
western American states increases, parties in the future will not be able to provide
evidence that goes back just as far. Accordingly, it may be simpler to abandon
presumptions entirely and simply require a plaintiff to establish the requisite
elements of an easement by a preponderance of the evidence standard over any
consecutive ten-year period. Furthermore, by placing the initial burden on the
plaintiff to prove each of the elements, rather than on the landowner to rebut the
presumption of adversity, such a system would be more in keeping with the
objectives of the Restatement.

233. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180.
234. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text. The court in Algermissen specifically discusses the
neighbor accommodation exception and the exception due to a close relationship between the parties. See alsosupra
Part V.B.
15, 61 P.3d at 182.
236. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001,
237. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
238. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 24, 61 P.3d at 184. The court ruled that the erection of a fence by
the Alleys was not effective interruption. Id. However, having already concluded that the trial court could have
reasonably found that the plaintiffs' use was permissive, there would have been no adverse use to interrupt. Id.
15,61 P.3d at 182.
239. Id. 117,61 P.3dat 182.
240. Id. 122, 61 P.3d at 184.
241. Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 503, 71 P.2d 646, 650 (1937).
242. See Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 5,61 P.3d at 179.
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'
and
Nevertheless, despite labeling presumptions as merely "rhetorical devises"243
244
professing to adopt the outlook of the Restatement, it seems clear that the use of
presumptions remained an essential part of the court's analysis. The impact of that
approach is significant. One consequence of allowing landholders the presumption
of permission in an urban setting,24' as was the case in Algermissen, while
concomitantly presuming adversity for claimants only when every other element is
met is that an easement by prescription becomes significantly more difficult to
acquire.
When the other elements of a prescriptive easement claim are considered in the
context of the decision in Algermissen, the extent to which the new law favors
landowners might be even more overwhelming. For example, the court suggests that
the consolidation of the elements "open" and "notorious" into a notice or knowledge
requirement is simply a more succinct method for describing the law that already
existed. 246 However, if the two elements are easier to understand as one requirement,
it now is significantly harder for plaintiffs to prove that requirement. The facts of
Algermissen consisted of one landowner family, the Alleys, who had actual
knowledge that the claimants had been using their property, 247 and another
landowner family, the Sutins, whom the court found had constructive knowledge.248
If this scenario does not qualify as "knowledge," what type of proof will lawyers in
New Mexico need to offer in order to prove this element?
Finally, even though the court did not directly address the constitutional question
put forth by the defendants in Algermissen, its refusal to dismiss the question's
potential relevancy adds another challenge for future plaintiffs. It is counterintuitive
to describe public easements as presenting "unique analytical problems ""' and as
challenges requiring analysis no different from private easements. 250 This, combined
25
with the court's awareness of significant federal developments in this area of law, '
only serve to complicate the analysis of potential litigants in the future.

VII. CONCLUSION
In its effort to clarify the law of prescriptive easements,252 the New Mexico
Supreme Court has also elevated the bar a party attempting to claim an easement
must hurdle. While the attempt to clarify a body of law dependent on fact finding
and confusing common law is laudable, the court should revisit its analysis in
Algermissen v. Sutin. Rather than simplifying the law of prescriptive easements in
the state, it solidified the use of vague presumptions to establish adversity, raised the
243. Id. 1 11, 61 P.3d at 181 (citing Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240, 244, 771 P.2d
i73, i77 989)).
244. Id. 1 10, 61 P.2d at 180. The Restatement takes no position with reference to the use of presumptions.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000).
245. The setting in Algermissen is in opposition to the sparsely populated, rural setting envisioned by the
neighbor accommodation exception. See supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 108.
247. See supra note 101.
248. See supra note 102.
249. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180.
250. Id. 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180-81.
251. See supra Part V.A.2.
252. Algermissen, 2003-NMSC-001, 1 10, 61 P.3d at 180.
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landholder knowledge requirement to a height impossible for any plaintiff to meet,
and inspired a constitutional complication heretofore not a part of the case law.

